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BOOK REVIEWS 
The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes. Edward R. Wierenga. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989. Pp. xii and 238. $28.50. 
THOMAS P. FLINT, University of Notre Dame 
Edward Wierenga's The Nature of God is a wide-ranging philosophical in-
vestigation of the attributes of the God of traditional Christians. The book 
focusses primarily on the type of power, knowledge, and goodness which can 
properly be ascribed to such a being. One chapter is devoted to omnipotence, 
five to omniscience (and such related issues as foreknowledge, freedom, the 
necessity of the past, middle knowledge, and eternity), and two to perfect 
goodness and the divine command theory of morality. 
There is much to admire in Wierenga's book. The argumentation is careful 
and precise, and many parts of the work (a prime instance being the masterful 
chapter on omniscience) are truly exemplary pieces of philosophy. Neverthe-
less, The Nature of God includes several sections which leave something to 
be desired. Here I will discuss three areas where I feel Wierenga goes astray: 
his analysis of omnipotence, his defence of the claim that freedom and fore-
knowledge are compatible, and his presentation of middle knowledge. 
Wierenga's discussion of omnipotence utilizes several terms and concepts 
popularized in the work of Alvin Plantinga, a philosopher whose enormous 
influence upon Wierenga is acknowledged at the start of the text (p. xi) and 
is evident throughout the work. Wierenga argues that a proper explication of 
omnipotence needs to take account of the fact that there are (at least) two 
ways in which God can be said to bring about a state of affairs S-by strongly 
actualizing it (i.e., roughly, by causing it), or by weakly actualizing it (i.e., 
by strongly actualizing some other state of affairs T such that God's strongly 
actualizing T counterfactually implies S's being actual). By combining this 
distinction with the concept of an initial segment of a possible world, where 
the initial segment of a world Wat a time t is represented by sew. t) and is 
to be thought of roughly as containing the history of Wat t, Wierenga offers 
the following as a definition of omnipotence: 
(0*) a being x is omnipotent in a world Wat a time t =df. In W it is true 
both that (i) for every state of affairs A, if it is possible that both sew, 
t) obtains and that x strongly actualizes A at t, then at t x can strongly 
actualize A. and (ii) there is some state of affairs which x can strongly 
actualize at t (p. 25) 
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As Wierenga notes (p. 15, fn. 9), this definition is quite similar in motiva-
tion to the independent analysis of omnipotence which Alfred Freddoso and 
I offered several years ago. 1 Each of these analyses was framed with the 
distinction between strong and weak actualization squarely in mind. Each 
was also founded upon the assumption that what Plantinga calls Leibniz's 
Lapse-viz., the thesis that, if a world is logically possible, it follows that 
God (being omnipotent) had the power to create it-is indeed a lapse, and 
that we thus need to distinguish between possible and feasible worlds, where 
only the latter are actualizable by God. Yet despite these similarities, the 
analyses ended up differing in significant respects-e.g., our analysans uses 
the general concept of actualizing which incorporates both strong and weak 
actualizing, whereas Wierenga's is restricted to strong actualization. 
It seems to me that the analysis offered by Freddoso and me is resilient in 
the face of objections which bedevil a definition such as Wierenga's. Take, 
for example, the pesky McEar, the famed fellow who is essentially capable 
only of scratching his left ear. Given COO), McEar would rank as omnipotent, 
for (to state things informally) provided that he can scratch his left ear, there 
are things he can do and he can do anything which it's possible that he do. 
After some preliminary fussing with precisely how McEar is to be described, 
Wierenga responds to the challenge posed by this redoubtable figure by 
throwing him out of the court of the possible: 
But is it really possible that there be a being whose abilities are essentially 
limited in this way? For any agent who is incapable of tying a shoe, it would 
seem to be at least possible that God confer on the agent greater powers that 
include the ability to tie a shoe. In that case, it would be possible for any 
such limited being to do more than it is able to do (p. 29). 
Let me make two points in response. First, I see little reason to doubt that 
there could be an essentially limited being of the appropriate sort. Some 
powers-e.g., to take one mentioned by Wierenga himself in the sentence 
preceding the above quotation, the ability to create something ex nihilo-
seem to me to be ones which many (perhaps all non-omnipotent) beings are 
essentially incapable of possessing, but which we would expect an omnipo-
tent being to possess. Second, it's not clear to me that it's the possibility of 
such an essentially limited being which is really the issue. So long as such a 
being is both clearly conceivable and clearly not omnipotent, doesn't it follow 
that Wierenga's definition fails to capture the concept of omnipotence, 
whether or not it offers necessary and sufficient conditions for being omnip-
otent? Thus, I find it hard to understand why Wierenga is not persuaded that 
McEar shows that his definition needs to be scratched. 
Wierenga's defense of his definition in the face of other objections is also 
somewhat puzzling. Arguing (on p. 26) that COO) is compatible with the claim 
that God is essentially morally perfect, Wierenga says that the actual world's 
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initial segment will include God's having made certain promises (e.g., not to 
lay waste the earth with a flood). On the next page, however, when discussing 
the claim that God's foreknowledge would raise problems for (0*), Wierenga 
replies by denying that God's foreknowledge is to be thought of as part of 
the initial world segment. Such a combination of positions seems rather peculiar. 
A case could surely be made for saying that both divine promisings and divine 
foreknowings are part of the history of the world; a case could also be made for 
saying that neither are part of the history of the world. But to say that the 
promisings are, while the foreknowings aren't, is surely strange. 
Wierenga's view on foreknowledge is evident as well in the second of the 
three areas I wish to examine-his discussion of the alleged incompatibility 
between divine foreknowledge and human free will. As Wierenga sees it, 
foreknowledge and freedom can be shown to be incompatible if the following 
thesis can be shown to be true: 
(c*) There is a concept of accidental necessity satisfying the following 
conditions: (i) for all times tl and t2 such that tl is earlier than f2 and 
for every proposition p, if at 1I God believes p, then at f2 the proposi-
tion, Af tl God believes p, is accidentally necessary, (ii) for every time 
t and for all propositions p and q, if P is accidentally necessary at t, p 
entails q, and it is possible that q is false, then q is accidentally nec-
essary at t, and (iii) for every time fl and proposition p, if P is acci-
dentally necessary at fl, then there is no person S, action A, and time 
f2 at least as late as 1I such that S can do A at f2 and if S were to do A 
at t2 then p would be false (p. 86). 
Wierenga looks at several characterizations of accidental necessity and the 
related hard/soft fact distinction (offered by Freddoso, Eddy Zemach and 
David Widerker, John Fischer, and Alvin Plantinga), and concludes (to make 
a very long and detailed story very short) that none of these attempts offers 
the proponent of (C*) much support because none of them offers an account 
of accidental necessity which makes condition (i) of (C*) true-i.e., which 
makes all of God's past beliefs accidentally necessary. Hence, he concludes, 
the thesis of incompatibility has not been established. 
Though I commend Wierenga's conclusion here, there is something about 
his presentation which leaves me uneasy-something which has more to do 
with what he implies than what he actually says. For Wierenga at least sug-
gests that the only plausible way of escaping the incompatibility argument is 
the Ockhamist strategy of denying that God's past beliefs about the contingent 
future are hard facts about the past. And in this suggestion he is simply mistaken. 
As Freddoso has pointed out in his recent translation of Part IV of Molina's 
Concordia, the Molinist response to the charge of incompatibility is to frame a 
concept of accidental necessity according to which although God's past beliefs 
are accidentally necessary, the concept of accidental necessity is not closed 
under entailment, and propositions which are accidentally necessary are not 
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necessarily beyond our counterfactual control.2 Putting this in terms of 
Wierenga's (C*), the Molinist response is not the Ockhamist one that, though 
plausible analyses of accidental necessity can render (ii) and (iii) true, (i) remains 
false; on the contrary, the Molinist contends that, though the most plausible 
analysis of accidental necessity renders (i) true, (ii) and (iii) remain false. 
My point here is not to argue for the superiority of either the Ockhamist 
or the Molinist response, but rather to point out that even a careful reader of 
Wierenga is given no reason to suspect that there so much as is a viable 
Molinist alternative. In short, Wierenga's discussion of this issue, for all its 
sophistication and analytical merits, is impoverished in a crucial respect. 
Readers wishing to be introduced to the issue would be better served by 
examining the clearer, richer presentations offered, on the one side, by 
Freddoso or, on the other side, by William Hasker.3 
Molina's name, of course, is most frequently associated with the notion of 
middle knowledge, and Wierenga devotes the (by far) longest chapter in his 
book to his explication and defense of this notion. Wierenga thinks that 
middle knowledge plays a crucial role in both the Free Will Defense and the 
concept of providence, and argues (in ways that are virtually always inge-
nious and frequently convincing) that the objections raised against middle 
knowledge by such stalwart critics as Robert Adams, Anthony Kenny and 
William Hasker are unsound. Though I agree wholeheartedly with Wierenga's 
emphasis on the philosophical and theological importance of middle knowl-
edge, and commend him for most of his responses to the critics of Molinism, 
I am troubled by Wierenga's handling of the issue, for his explication of the 
doctrine of middle knowledge strikes me as both historically insensitive and 
philosophically questionable. 
As Molina saw it, middle knowledge amounts primarily (though not nec-
essarily exclusively) to God's knowledge of how any free creature he might 
create would freely act in any situation in which that creature might be created 
and left free. As a libertarian, Molina thought of middle knowledge as stand-
ing between God's natural knowledge (of necessary truths which are not 
subject to his free will) and his free knowledge (of contingent truths which 
are subject to his free will); the objects of middle knowledge are contingent 
truths which are not subject to his free will. This is the way in which Molina, 
his supporters and his detractors have consistently understood the term "mid-
dle knOWledge"; to define it in some other way is sure to lead to confusion. 
Wierenga's definition, I fear, is guilty in just this way. Wierenga suggests 
that, though the principal objects of middle knowledge should be thought of 
as counterfactuals of freedom, such counterfactuals with fairly thin anteced-
ents do not offer us the most suitable candidates, for it is plausible to deny 
that the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle applies to them. His solution 
is to beef up the antecedents. Letting T(W) stand for the largest state of affairs 
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which God strongly actualizes in W, Wierenga calls any counterfactuals of 
the forms exemplified by 
or 
(37) If God were to strongly actualize T(W) then W would be actual 
(38) If God were to strongly actualize T(W) then [person] P would do 
[action] A 
counterfactuals of world-actualization (p. 139). He then proceeds to define 
the doctrine of middle knowledge as the following thesis: 
(39) For every counterfactual of world-actualization, (p -+ q), either God 
knows (p -+ q) or God knows (p -+ -q). 
The crucial historical problem with viewing (39) as defining middle knowl-
edge is that, much like the frequently expressed but even less historically 
attuned definition of middle knowledge as just knowledge of counterfactuals 
of freedom, it does not allow us to distinguish proponents from opponents of 
the doctrine. For the major historical opponents of middle knowledge, the Tho-
mists, would deny neither that God knows counterfactuals of freedom nor that 
he knows counterfactuals of world-actualization. Their claim, rather, has consis-
tently been that the counterfactuals in question are part of either God's natural 
knowledge or his free knowledge, depending upon whether or not God's 
actions concurrent with the action in question are thought of as being included 
in the antecedents. In other words, Molinists cannot be separated from non-
Molinists just in terms of which counterfactuals God knows. 
Wierenga acknowledges in a footnote (fn. 45, pp. 139-140) that his definition 
is ahistorical in this fashion, but apparently isn't bothered by the fact. Though I 
question the wisdom of thus endorsing a definition which blurs a significant 
philosophical distinction, my problems with (39) are not primarily historical. 
Rather, I think that a careful appraisal of (39) shows that it simply cannot function 
as our definition of the doctrine of middle knowledge, at least not if we see middle 
knowledge as playing the crucial role in providence which Wierenga affirms. 
Wierenga is surely right in suggesting that counterfactuals with especially 
thin antecedents cannot plausibly serve as elements of God's middle knowl-
edge. The typical Molinist response to this truth has been to enrich the 
antecedents of the relevant counterfactuals so that they include an exhaustive 
statement of the circumstances obtaining prior to and at the time of the action 
in question.4 While the Molinist thus attempts to add some weight to the 
antecedents, Wierenga opts for the strategy of making them positively obese. 
For counterfactuals of world-actualization differ from the Molinist counter-
factuals just described primarily in the fact that their antecedents can include 
reference to states of affairs which God strongly actualizes after the time of 
the action in question. 
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Such an approach seems to me to be exceedingly counterintuitive, for what 
God does after a person acts is in no sense part of the circumstances in which 
the person acts. But my objection to counterfactuals of world-actualization 
is not based primarily on my intuitive feel for what the objects of middle 
knowledge should look like. If Molinist counterfactuals are true, there is no 
need for us to define the doctrine of middle knowledge in terms of counter-
factuals of world-actualization. But it seems to be demonstrable that God's 
knowledge of counterfactuals of world-actualization can be useful to him 
only if he does know Molinist counterfactuals, and hence that the former 
counterfactuals are of little help in understanding middle knowledge. 
Let's take as an example the first case of a free action in a world W Suppose 
that God has strongly actualized every contingent state of affairs in this world 
prior to a time t at which a certain creature (call him Adam) faces a free 
decision (say, that of eating or not eating an apple which God has forbidden 
him to eat). Let h stand for the history of the world up to t and e stand for 
Adam's freely eating the apple. Now, the relevant Molinist counterfactual 
here would be something like (h -> e ); if God has middle knowledge, then, 
he would know either (h -> e) or (h -- -e). And according to the Molinist it 
would be on the basis of this knowledge that God would exercise his provi-
dence and possess foreknowledge with respect to Adam's action. Having known 
from eternity that, say, (h -- e) is true, and having providentially decreed that h 
would obtain, God would have foreknowledge of the occurrence of e. 
How, we might ask, is God to exercise such providence or possess such 
foreknowledge under Wierenga's construal of middle knowledge? According 
to Wierenga, it might well be that God knows neither (h -- e) nor (h -> -e), 
but instead knows some counterfactual of world-actualization such as 
[T(W) -> e], where T(W) is thought of as including such later states of affairs 
as God's punishing Adam at t + n. And, Wierenga might argue, it is on the 
basis of such a counterfactual that God exercises providence and possesses 
foreknowledge: knowing that [T(W) -> e], and having providentially decided 
to actualize T(W), God would foreknow that e would occur. 
A moment's (or, at any rate, a few hours') reflection, though, should show 
that Wierenga's alternative is simply not tenable. For how can God decide 
whether or not to actualize T( W) unless he first knows whether or not Adam 
would freely eat the apple when in h? T(W), like most of the interesting largest 
states of affairs God might strongly actualize, includes many states of affairs 
which are most properly seen as reactions to what creatures like Adam do-
e.g., the punishment which T(W) includes is clearly a consequence of Adam's 
free sinful action. So how can God decide to actualize such a state of affairs 
as T(W) unless he already knows that Adam, if placed in the circumstance 
which that state of affairs entails will occur before t, would so act as to justify 
the punishment which that state of affairs entails will occur after t? Indeed, 
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how can God so much as know that he has the power to actualize T(W) unless 
he knows whether or not Adam would eat the apple if placed in h? Hence, 
God's knowledge of which largest state of affairs he'll strongly actualize must 
be logically posterior to his knowledge of what Adam would do in h; if God 
doesn't first know the latter, there is no way in which he can know the former. 
But if God can thus employ Wierenga's counterfactuals of world-actualiza-
tion only if he knows Molinist counterfactuals, then Wierenga's counterfac-
tuals can play no essential role in a theory of middle knowledge. 
As is customary in reviews such as this, my remarks have focussed primar-
ily on the faults I find with Wierenga's work, and thus might well mask the 
large extent to which I find his positions admirably stated and ably defended. 
Despite what I see as the three significant flaws in the book, and despite the 
surprisingly careless editing which was done with the text (I noticed well 
over a dozen cases of misspelling, missing words and the like), Wierenga's 
The Nature of God is a fine piece of work, one which scholars concerned 
with divine attributes should profit from considerably.s 
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3. See Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 
chapters 2-7. 
4. See, for example, Freddoso's introduction to 011 Divine Foreknowledge, pp. 22, 50. 
5. I am grateful to Alfred Freddoso, Alvin Plantinga and Especially Edward Wierenga 
for comments on an earlier version of this review. 
Relativism, Nihilism, and God, Philip E. Devine. Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1989. xix and 119. $22.95 
FREDERICK FERRE, The University of Georgia 
This is a remarkable little book. It packs plenty of explosives into its 109 
pages of text. It reads well, written in a fresh, confident tone. And it is written 
in a good cause: to provide theoretical underpinnings that permit joint alle-
giance to the life of faith and the life of reason. 
The argument by which this cause is pursued is quite straightforward. In 
the name of a transcendent Truth, Devine attacks pragmatism, relativism, and 
nihilism. The first naturalizes the standards of truth, the second pluralizes 
